EU rules for ratification and their comparison with the US constitution
In contrast with the vivid debates of the American constitution making exercise, the Convention on the Future of Europe discussed ratification very scarcely. Political realism made even the most ardent federalist to accept that ratification would proceed along the traditional international law mechanisms.
Article IV-447 uses the typical normalised language of international law treaties and it is, following de Witte's opinion, the clearest formal confirmation that the constitutional treaty is, from the point of view of its drafters, a truly international treaty (de Witte; 2005: 194) .
The constitution maintains the ratification acquis consolidated in former treaties and adopts the same procedures and requirements: as for the threshold requirement, Constitution drafters did not modify the former requirement of unanimity. This bounds together the fate of all and every Member State: an eventual failure to ratify in one of them will spill over automatically in all the EU. However, it is not this common fate what national provisions take as the criteria for ratification but rather, specific national circumstances. National definitions and understandings of membership both in constitutional and political terms remains the basic backbone for national ratification and, in this form, ratification responds to the coincidence of different (and even antagonistic) national projects.
The Constitutional procedure follows the path of earlier treaties: ratification will proceed in accordance with national constitutional requirements (art. . This has been interpreted as a mild constraint or a "constitutionally sensible" international law mechanism, meaning the need of parliamentary approval in all signatory estates (de Witte; . Even though parliamentary ratification is common to all Member States, national constitutions pose a vast group of additional procedures for ratification (constitutional reform, previous intervention of courts, parliamentary ratification with or without reinforced majorities, referendums -either consultative or binding).
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-4 -This limited constraint of EU rules compares with the strength of the rules for ratification included in the US Constitution that directed towards strong "Americanization or "nationalization" of States and states constitutions. This happened by means of two rules; being the first the number of ratifications from contracting parties required for the Constitution to be valid. The US Constitution (article VII) established that the ratification of the Conventions of nine states shall be sufficient for the establishment of this constitution between the states so ratifying the same. The effects of this threshold shorter than unanimity are known: The nine state rule (…) gave each state an incentive to consider its long run as well as its short-term interests (Beer, 1993: 332) .
Despite overwhelming opposition against, the New York convention ratified the Constitution when other 9 states had effectively done so.
This threshold does not only provide a frame for the rational calculation of the options of a single state. It has also theoretical significance. In words of Madison, the unanimous assent of the several parties that are part to it
[transforms] the act establishing the constitution into an act of the people, as forming so many independent states, not as forming an aggregate nation. 1 In contrary sense, Calhoun argued that ratification was the act of the several states acting in their separate capability and, consequently, final unanimity did not transform the basic fact that the act of ratification (…) established it as the constitution between the states ratifying it, and only between them (Calhoun; 1849: 92 and 87) .
The second issue of the American experience with paradigmatic value for the EU refers to the procedures for ratifying the Constitution. In the USA case, the Philadelphia Convention hotly debated whether state conventions or legislative assemblies should be the organs in charge of ratification. The option for either 1 Federalist 39. This statement contradicts Madison's earlier views. Samuel H. Beer proposes three interpretations in order to settle the contradiction. 1. The sovereignty which makes a constitution (…) resides not in a single state, but in the people of each of the several states, uniting with those of others in the express and solemn compact which forms a the constitution (Writings, quoted by Beer; 1993) . 2. Two steps of the same procedure. First, peoples from different states formed themselves into an American people who, acting as the Constitutional sovereign, ordained secondly the Constitution. 3. The American people existed for a generation before the Constitution and it was the sovereign people that created the states. WORKING PAPER n.º 8 (Calhoun; 1849: 88) .
As it has been argued, EU norms for ratification impose scarce pressures on national constitutions. They just establish a timetable constraint and the referent to national constitutional requirements (that, at best, for some, imply an obligation to observe and adhere to parliamentary ratification). There is not great pressure for change nor need for institutional adaptation for the top down level. Europeanization, thus, has not been imposed from the top constitutional norms However, Europeanization has happened in a different way, as an increasing convergence of procedures. Europeanization may result from the bottom-up convergence of national ratification models. Even lacking a common framework based on the EU constitution and the application of 25 different procedures, the current process may reveal some traits of an emerging constitutional convention on ratification of the EU constitution whose importance will be only evident ad futurum. If there is a degree of convergence on procedures, then the emergence WORKING PAPER n.º 8 (Cartabia, 2005: 284) . The following two subsections examine the perceptions of national governments and national constitutional courts and other advisory bodies on this issue. Thus, the prevalent interpretation among these member States was the referendums on accession and the constitutional reforms implemented for membership covered already the EU Constitution which, implicitly, was not considered a significant transformation of the EU. There is one exception to the prevailing interpretation among governments. In Denmark, the Ministry of Justice issued a Declaration that argued that the EU Constitution would compromise the country's sovereignty in privacy protection laws, diplomatic 3 The Constitutions of new member States granted a bold status to the principle of sovereignty and independence and since the very beginning they were reluctant to transferring powers to I.Os. And even though their constitutions had to be opened to become part of the EU, constitutional reforms were relatively small because of a conjunction of factors: a relatively high euro-esceptic public opinion; the complexity of the procedures for constitutional reform and a particular conception of the principle of sovereignty (Albi; 2005: 315) .
National governments perceptions
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-10 -immunity, the transfer of capital, intellectual property rights, health issues and free movement of citizens. In particular, the "flexibility clause," providing for the expansion of EU's jurisdiction without parliamentary ratification or approval by referendum, conflicts with the Danish Constitution. Since the EU Constitution would limit Danish sovereignty, five-sixths of Denmark's Parliament would have to vote for it or a referendum would need to be won for the EU Constitution to be approved.
The view from advisory bodies and constitutional courts
In the cases in which a previous judgment on the constitutionality of the EU constitution is required, this process offers a window of opportunity for certain actors with the capability to shape the debate and define the sense and path of In Spain, a preliminary ruling was not compulsory but the opinion of the Council of State and pressure from opposition parties forced the government to seek it. The consult was framed along four questions: incompetent: it would be a novel and dangerous doctrine that a legislature could change the constitution under which it held its existence. He considered the differences between a system founded on the legislatures only and one founded on the people, to be the true difference between a league or treaty and a constitution (Elliot; 1907: 356 and sovereign states) (Calhoun; 1849: 93) . In other words, Calhoun interprets that the fact of avoiding state legislatures as the ratifying organs was insufficient to create a new and independent source of validity for the US constitution that was still subject to the States: the authority which ordains and establishes is higher than that which is ordained and established (Calhoun; 1849: 94) . Parliamentary ratification is the main (and single) process in most countries and even when a referendum has been convened, parliament ratification is also formally required. Formally, a distinction can be drawn between these cases in which the competent authority for ratification is the parliament itself (authorization) and those in which it is not and only a consultation is formally required. The later category comprises UK and Ireland, being formally facultative in the first and compulsory in Ireland. For all other Member States, parliamentary authorization is required. In these cases, the intervention of Parliaments is constructed as a mechanism of control on the authority with the effective capability to sign the Treaty (normally, the government). In this situation, rejection seems a highly unlikely outcome (and, in 
Referendums on the Constitution
The referendums convened to ratify the EU constitution are something of a novelty in one respect: never before so many countries held a referendum on the same issue mobilising such an enormous amount of citizens to back a decision 
Ratification through referendums as result of domestic tactical considerations
One of the explanations is the coincidence of domestic factors. In several of the referendums on the EU constitution, partisan factors (i.e. strategic calculus of the effects of referendums on the domestic electoral struggle) may account for the recourse to this specific institute of direct democracy. Parties calculate the electoral advantage that may derive from using the referendum on a specific party setting. Whether or not their calculations are accurate, politicians seem to base their behaviour on a plain calculus of the hypothetical advantage. In many cases, the referendums reflect not so much an overdue aspiration to explain
Europe to the citizen as a manoeuvre to avoid short-term domestic political problems. Several of the cases taken in this paper confirm that the decision for convening of the referendum resulted also from a calculus of its electoral and partisan impact (UK, France, Germany, the Czech Republic, Poland). These decisions are constructed in four situations (Closa; .
1. Governments may use referendums as tactical weapon in strengthening its power (Bogdanor; 1994: 31) . Governments use non-required votes it in order to strengthen its own position either by attempting to gloss over internal Among the countries holding a referendum, governments appealed commonly to the fact that the EU Constitution represents a qualitative change in the process of European integration that requires an input of direct citizens' legitimacy. These arguments were voiced in Spain, France, Portugal and Poland.
In Spain, the Conservative government initially opposed holding a referendum.
Former Foreign Affairs Minister and member of the Convention Ana Palacio rejected this proposal in 2002 and said that since it is a Treaty, it should not be subject to a popular consultation, "nobody has ever seen a treaty being ratified by a referendum. It is not the usual way, since a referendum always refers to internal matters of the member states". 9 In a similar U-turn to the British case, the Conservative government changed mind and proposed holding the first consult on the EU to be held in Spain. The main supporting argument became that the Constitution was not another Treaty but a re-foundational act whose Similar arguments were voiced by the Dutch government (in its general comment of the Treaty) for whom it was not merely another Treaty amendment and, hence, it required more involvement from the citizens (hence, a referendum). In doing so, the Dutch government disregarded the opinion of the Council of State for whom the EU Constitution did not affect Dutch Constitution and it did not imply new transfer of powers. On this, the government followed the claims of the opposition parties that argued that the referendum would increase the role of citizens in EU politics and their awareness on EU issues in general (Hussain, Maitland and Whitman; . Also in Portugal, Prime
Minister Durao Barroso invoked in Autumn 2003 the necessity that the (Portuguese) people would legitimise the Constitution.
In countries not holding a referendum, opposition parties borrowed arguments developed in other Member States. They emphasised that decisions concerning reform of the EU had a cross-partisan character and affected the nation in a different way to normal politics. This happened in Germany and
Greece. In Germany, the FDP submitted two Proposals of Law 11 for reforming the Fundamental Law with the objective of holding a referendum on the EU constitution. The justification argued that the EU constitution entails a fundamental change of the EU that conditions the future development both in its very nature and its competencies. Hence, citizens should have the possibility to decide on it. The Green Party argued also that the EU Constitution is something qualitatively different from former treaties and it enhances the efficiency, transparency and democracy in the Union. A referendum will increase its legitimacy and it would create a European space for debate. In Germany, the EU referendum issue became intermingled with earlier and ongoing discussions on the necessity to reform the Constitution in order to introduce elements of direct democracy. In Greece, the Socialist PASOK party WORKING PAPER n.º 8 would "satisfy the demand of citizens to be fully informed and to decide the future of Greece in the EU."
In summary, domestic political and electoral reasons explain why convening referendums but the EU Constitution raised also a strong doctrinal case on the necessity of ratification through referendum. The coincidence of a growing number of member states on referendum as the essential ratification mechanism (even in countries that normally do not use it) marks an emerging "europeanisation" of the procedure.
Concluding remarks: How much Europeanisation?
Despite the reference to national constitutional procedures, the three 
